We describe the industrial project that a "proliferator" would conduct to produce a first, small batch of nuclear weapons. From refining yellowcake ore to final weapons assembly, we highlight the project's tasks and their interactions. The proliferator can choose alternative production technologies that offer quicker completion, but at higher cost in terms of limited resources. The proliferator can also expedite his project by devoting more resources to critical tasks. From physics and chemistry, we determine raw material requirements. From industrial engineering and materials science, we convert these requirements into estimates of the time, manpower, energy, and money required to complete each task under normal and expedited conditions. Using generalized projectmanagement analysis tools, we then estimate the earliest possible completion time of the project, assuming two different levels of resource availability. We also estimate the time required to complete a weapon if some of the project's steps can be skipped; for example, if the proliferator acquires stolen, highly enriched uranium metal.
INTRODUCTION
This article documents the component tasks of a major industrial project that a "proliferator" must complete, or may need to complete, to produce "a first nuclear weapon." By this last phrase, we mean a first small batch of crude nuclear weapons. We integrate details from physics, chemistry, industrial engineering, and materials science to create a generalized critical-path network model of the project. 1 We also derive estimates of raw-material, manpower, energy, and time requirements for task completions under normal or expedited conditions. With this information and the model, we then show how to estimate the earliest possible completion time for such a project given different assumed levels of resources. An extended model in a follow-on article 2 shows how one might delay the project's overall completion time by disrupting certain tasks through, for example, embargoes on key materials. The current article should provide policymakers with a sound quantitative basis for devising technologically oriented policies regarding nonproliferation. 3 The details of the proliferator's nuclear-weapons program depend on too many factors to consider in a single article, so we make the following simplifying assumptions in a case study: (a) The program is covert, (b) the proliferator already produces yellowcake uranium for use in civilian reactors or for sale to others, (c) he will pursue a simple fission weapon, and (d) he has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
A nuclear-weapons program is complex, but the basics of nuclear-weapon design are now well known and publicly available: 4 The acquisition of weaponsgrade uranium or plutonium is the proliferator's main hurdle to creating a nuclear weapon, not theoretical physics. But, (a) neither uranium nor plutonium are available on the open market, (b) NPT inspections preclude the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel into weapons-grade plutonium, and (c) we shall initially assume that stolen materials are unavailable. Consequently, the key to creating a nuclear weapon covertly will be the proliferator's development of an organic manufacturing infrastructure for weapons-grade uranium and/or plutonium. A plutonium-based weapon would require the covert construction of a nuclear reactor, and plutonium is difficult to handle, so it is reasonable to assume that the proliferator would choose a simpler, uranium-based weapon. Yellowcake uranium oxide, diverted from civilian use, will constitute the raw material. (For context, see Spears 5 who traces the lifecycle of nuclear materials from raw ore to waste disposal.)
Yellowcake can be diverted from civilian use even if the proliferator does not operate a nuclear fuel cycle. For example, controlling a uranium mine suffices because yellowcake can be diverted from the ore-processing facilities near such a mine. More than 30 countries have proven uranium reserves, and surely others have uranium-ore deposits that have not been discovered, or at least not reported. Uranium oxide can also be extracted from certain ores that are sold in international commerce for their scandium, vanadium, or other metal content. This offers another means to obtain yellowcake, or a substitute for it, without operating a nuclear fuel cycle.
The proliferator will need to commit a great deal of material, manpower, and technology to all parts of his nuclear-weapons project, from constructing manufacturing infrastructure for uranium metal, to the acquisition of a weapons-delivery method, for example ballistic missiles. Managing such a complex and expensive project is difficult without some sort of project-management protocol, especially if the project is to remain covert. Since the late 1950s, governments and industry have widely employed techniques of operations research to the scheduling and coordination of complex projects. In particular, the basic methods of the Program Evaluation Review Technique/Critical Path Method (PERT/CPM) have been extended over the years to manage the complexities that arise in real-world projects. 6 Moder, Phillips, and Davis define a project as "a set of tasks or activities related to the achievement of some planned objective, normally where the objective is unique or non-repetitive."
7 The proliferator's program to develop a first nuclear weapon fits this definition well. We can therefore reasonably expect him to employ standard project-management tools such as Microsoft Project to plan, organize, and schedule the project's tasks efficiently. 8 In any case, we will use these tools to estimate the project's completion time, and should the proliferator choose to act suboptimally by not using such tools, the resulting estimate will be appropriately conservative for our purposes. That is, the project will take longer to complete than we estimate.
Project-management models are universally represented as networks. In the now-standard activity-on-node version of a project network, nodes represent important (sub)tasks that must be completed to finish the project, whereas arcs represent precedence relationships between tasks. In the basic model, a task-i node is connected to a task-j node with a directed arc (i, j) if task i must be completed before task j is begun. Each node i possesses a "length" that represents task i's nominal duration; arcs have zero length. The overall duration of the project, from an artificial "start task" to an artificial "finish task," is the total length of the longest, directed path through the network, also known as the critical path.
We must generalize the basic project model, as follows:
1. Completion of any task in a "normal" amount of time consumes a fixed amount of one or more resources that are in limited supply. 9 In particular, we model consumption of energy, raw materials, and three types of manpower, and through these, the consumption of money.
2. The duration of an individual task may be expedited, that is, shortened, by allocation of additional quantities of required resources. 10, 11 We assume a linear relationship between the amount of each additional resource provided and the duration of the task: More resources accelerate progress. However, each task requires some minimum amount of time to complete, below which additional resources have no effect. An activity-on-node project network with one decision node. Tasks represented by nodes 1 through 6, and 9 through 11, must be completed to complete the project. A triangular node represents a "decision task" 14 : After Task 5 is complete, either Task 7 or Task 8 must be completed. Arcs represent precedence relationships.
4. Standard finish-to-start (FS) precedence relationships between pairs of tasks are generalized to include start-to-start (SS), finish-to-finish (FF), or start-to-finish (SF). Given this generality, it is easy to accommodate a lagor lead-time between pairs of tasks. 5. Certain milestone events, most importantly the stockpiling of adequate supplies of highly enriched uranium metal (HEU), can be achieved via alternative courses of action. When one such alternative is chosen, the tasks in the other alternative(s) need not be completed. Alternative courses of action diverge at decision nodes; 13 see Figure 1 . In our case study, the decision node chooses one of three uranium-enrichment technologies.
Within the limits of his resources, the proliferator wishes to minimize the completion time of his weapons project, that is, crash the project, by expediting "critical tasks" (i.e., tasks on the critical path), and tasks that become critical as other task durations are reduced.
ASSUMPTIONS
Given the proliferator's goal of completing a first weapon as soon as possible, we assume he will pursue a gun-type fission weapon, the same design used in the "Little Boy" bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945. That design is simple but reliable: Little Boy was relatively crude, but its designers were so confident that Hiroshima was its first full-scale test. 15 The gun-type weapon requires more HEU than the alternative, an implosion weapon, but the latter design would require high-visibility, high-energy testing to ensure its reliability and it seems likely that a covert proliferator would prefer to avoid such testing.
"The first nuclear weapon" will really be a small number of weapons, the most that can be manufactured without undue risk of detection. We assume a production of six weapons per year, which we estimate will require an annual input of 300 kilograms (kg) of HEU. In turn, this will require the inputs The main tasks in the project are:
1. Covert diversion of 120 metric tons of yellowcake annually (this quantity amounts to only one medium truckload per month, is likely to go undetected, and is the key reason for assuming a production of at most six weapons per year);
2. Production of enrichment-plant feed material (uranium hexafluoride, UF 6 ) from yellowcake;
3. Uranium enrichment, including the choice of method to employ;
4. Conversion of highly enriched UF 6 to HEU metal; and 5. Design and construction of the actual weapons.
Appendix C displays the tasks included in our case study, and the Gantt chart in Figure 2 shows a small part of a complete production plan from that study.
We assess the requirements for specialized equipment from the chemical processes described in Appendix A. The project network comprises Figure 2 : Gantt chart, from Microsoft Project, depicting 9 out of about 200 tasks in the case-study project. (Created using Microsoft Project.) The solid horizontal bar for "Acquisition of production components" indicates a summary task. (A "summary task" is a feature of Microsoft Project, not a fundamental component of a standard project network.) This summary task comprises two (sub)tasks, the acquisition of a "Vortex unit" and of "Pumps and piping." The "forward" hashing on their corresponding bars indicates that they do not lie on the critical path. The task "Acquisition of plant site" is represented by two adjacent bars. The first bars "backward" hashing indicates that this task is critical, and its left and right endpoints represent the tasks planned, expedited start and completion dates, respectively. The tasks planned duration of 12 weeks is displayed to the right of the first bar. The second bars vertical hashing signals that the task has been expedited by an amount proportional to the bars length, which also happens to be 12 weeks. (The nominal, unexpedited duration of this task is 24 weeks.) The figure uses arrows to indicate precedence relationships between tasks. For example, there is an "SS" (start-to-start) relationship, including an 8-week lag, between "Design of production devices" and "Design of enrichment cascade." approximately 200 tasks (nodes) and 600 precedence relationships (arcs). The proliferator must manage five key resources in addition to money: energy, materials, professional labor (e.g., scientists and engineers), skilled labor (e.g., machinists), and unskilled labor. If the proliferator chooses to expedite a given task, he must expend more of each resource required for that task. The amount of resource r consumed, given task duration T, is assumed to be b r (1 + (a r − 1)(T − T)/(T − T)), whereT denotes the task's nominal duration, T denotes its minimum duration, T must satisfy T ≤ T ≤T, b r is the nominal consumption of that resource (i.e., when the task's duration isT), and a r is an "acceleration factor" that depends only on the resource. See Appendix C for the values ofT and T used in the case study; Table 2 lists the acceleration factors.
The proliferator can choose one of any number of enrichment technologies to pursue: In our case study his options are gas centrifuges, gaseous diffusion, or aerodynamic enrichment. Other enrichment technologies exist, but they are expensive and/or technically demanding, and therefore seem unlikely options. 16 However, any optional enrichment technique can be modeled with our methods. Table 1 shows how to estimate the required number of enrichment machines Each value is a multiplicative factor on total resource consumption for the fastest possible completion time of any task. For example, if 10 professional laborers are needed to complete a task its nominal timeT , then it would require 12 professional laborers (12 = 1.2 × 10) to complete the task in the shortest possible time T . 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Using the amounts of energy, materials, manpower, and labor listed in Table 3 , and a budget of $190 million, the proliferator uses aerodynamic enrichment to complete his project in 338 weeks (six and a half years).
If all resource availability is doubled, including that for dollars, crashing allows the proliferator to complete the project in 260 weeks (just under 5 years).
If we relax our initial assumption that stolen HEU is unavailable, and suppose the proliferator obtains 300 kg of stolen HEU directly from a third party, we have a scenario viewed by some as nearly equivalent to having a deliverable weapon. 18 Our model, appropriately modified and using nominal resource levels, shows that the proliferator will still need 208 weeks (4 years) to complete a first batch of 6 weapons. (With no organic source of HEU, that may also be the only batch of weapons he will ever be able to produce.) If the proliferator has access to unenriched uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), and has also developed a prototypic gas-centrifuge process (as Iran has), the model predicts that he will remain committed to gas-centrifuge enrichment, and will need an additional 216 weeks to complete his first weapon.
Even with 300 kg of HEU, the proliferator could be delayed in completing his project by limiting access to certain manufacturing components. "Acquire hafnia crucibles," task 127, is not a critical task-we estimate 24 weeks of slack here-but if we could delay this task in excess of 24 weeks, by any means, then we could delay a finished weapon by that excess. Furthermore, an instance of this task occurs in all alternative enrichment technologies, so the proliferator cannot avoid this delay by switching technologies.
Harney et al.
The International Atomic Energy Agency 19 has recently declared that more than 40 countries do not fully comply with the NPT, and lists several nations that are capable of, or are suspected of engaging in, nuclear-weapons development. This article has shown how any one of them could proceed in this development. 3. We find many books, papers, and reports that promote technology-based policies for nonproliferation, but, typically, the analysis of that technology is limited. 12. Early work on project networks required that a "successor task" not begin until after all its "predecessor tasks" had been completed; for example, see: D. G. 
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APPENDIX A. URANIUM-ENRICHMENT CHEMISTRY
We study these chemical processes to deduce the facilities and equipment required to produce enriched uranium metal from yellowcake. The numbers beneath the chemical reaction formulas are molecular weights.
Source • -800
• -800
Stainless steel reaction vessel (use hydrogen fluoride to convert uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride):
• -500
Ultrahigh-temperature gas-solid reactor vessel (production of uranium hexafluoride gas):
• -1800
Conversion of Uranium Hexafluoride to Uranium metal
Gas-phase reactor with particulate separation; uranium hexafluoride to uranium fluoride solid:
High-temperature metallurgical furnace; uranium fluoride to liquid uranium to be cast into weapon components:
• -700
314 + 2 × 40 = 238 + 2 × 78 or 314 + 2 × 24.3 = 238 + 2 × 62.3
APPENDIX B. CALCULATION OF RAW-MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SIX GUN-TYPE FISSION WEAPONS
This appendix assesses the quantity of key raw materials required to produce six fission weapons, each of which requires 50 kg of HEU. Each weapon requires 50 kg 93% HEU metal, so six weapons require 300 kg HEU metal.
Using the theoretical conversion listed earlier, and multiplying by 1.5 to account for imperfect production processes, we estimate that 300 kg HEU requires: 120,000 kg yellowcake 54,000 kg HNO 3 35,000 kg HF 16,500 kg F 2 150 kg Ca or 90 kg Mg These numbers are assumed when making the estimates in Appendix C.
APPENDIX C. TASKS INVOLVED IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
The data described here reflect standard engineering analyses, and are based on one author's experience in weapon-systems development and production. However, we have made no attempt to obtain actual costs from vendors or to extract detailed development-and-production data from specific programs; such data would almost certainly be classified or proprietary. Consequently, individual cost estimates may be accurate only to within a factor of two, up or down.
A bold task name indicates a summary task, which is feature of Microsoft Project, not a standard component of a project network. (Note: For technical reasons, summary tasks are split into "summary-task start" and "summarytask finish.") "Task" 28 is the decision node: Exactly one course of action must be chosen at this point. A component name by itself, for example, "Stainless steel boiler," implies that the corresponding task is "acquire this component." Column 1 gives task identifier or "ID"; column 2 gives the task's name; column 3 is a "Code" not used in this article; column 4 gives the nominal task duration in weeks (wks); column 5 gives the minimum task duration if additional resources are applied; column 6 gives the task's direct predecessors, which must be completed before the task can commence ("FS," "FF," and "SS" denote finish-to-start, finish-to-finish and start-to-start precedence relationships, respectively. Each such relationship can have a lead (−) or lag (+), measured in weeks, associated with it. For instance "7SS + 24" in row 9 indicates that task 8 cannot begin until 24 weeks after task 7 begins); column 7 specifies the energy, in megawatthours (MWhr), required to complete the task; column 8 specifies the millions of dollars ($M) in materials required to complete the task; column 9 gives the manmonths (mm) of professional labor required to complete the project; columns 10 and 11 are similar, but for skilled labor and unskilled labor, respectively. 
